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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
RUTH ETHEL DRURY 
MARSHALL, et al., 
Plaintiff and Respondents, 
vs. 
GEORGE T. TAYLER, 
Defendant .and Appellant. 
Case No. 8792 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
S'TATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Ruth Ethel Drury Marshall brought action 
against the defendant, George ·T. Tayler, sounding 
in tort; Fern Drury Tayler through intervention 
sought recovery for personal injuries to herself re-
sulting from the same alleged tortious act of the 
defendant. 
Fern Drury Tayler was during all times with 
which we are here concerned the wife of the de-
fendant. 
From an adverse verdict in the Court below 
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defendant brings his cause to this Honorable Court 
on appeal. 
SiTATEMEN'T OF FACT:S 
We will be concerned here with five principal 
persons: (1) the wife, Fern Drury ·Tayler; (2) 
the wife's sister, Ruth Drury Marshall; (3) the 
wife's sister's husband, Leland Marshall; {4) the 
wife's mother, Ethel Go Drury; (5) the defendant, 
George T. :Tayler. For purpose of clarity we shall 
refer to them in this brief as the wife, sister, broth-
er-in-law, mother and defendant. 
:The wife testified that she and defendant were 
1narried at Gallup, New Mexico on March 2, 1951; 
(Tr. 152), that she lived with him as man and wife 
for five· years ( Tr. 153). Hovvever, the wife lived 
at the home of her folks while the defendant occupied 
a hotel room W'hereat she said she saw l1im from 
the time she got off work until late at night. (Tr. 
154). She visited with him almost nightly during 
the five year period but she never did attempt to 
establish a residence for herself and defendant (Tr. 
154); although at one time he had an apartment 
(Tr. 154). The wife had never had an altercation 
with the defendant (Tr. 155), and sl1e knew that 
the defendant always evaded anything unpleasant 
(Tr. 158). 
At a family gathering sometime near the 
2 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
middle of August, 1956, there was an altercation 
and certain remarks made for which the defendant 
was chastised by the sister and the mother and 
thereupon the defendant "opened the door and walk-
ed out." (Tr. 176, 177, 178). The defendant had 
a reputation for being one to evade unpleasantness 
('Tr. 158; lines 6, 7, 8, Tr. 281; Tr. 27 4; Tr. 141). 
Defendant thereafter went to Grand County to es-
tab1is'h residence and secure a divorce ( Tr. 168) . 
We make the above recitation for the purpose of 
acquainting this Court with the relationship as it 
existed between the wife and the defendant. 
The following facts go directly to the issue. 
On September 11, 1956, the wife, sister, broth-
er-in-law, and the mother left Salt Lake City in 
the brother-in-law's automobile at about 7:00 p.m. 
(Tr. 111). Their destination was either 'Thompson 
or Moab, Utah (Tr. 111); they were looking for 
the defendant (Tr. 139). The party arrived at 
Thompson sometime between tvvelve and twelve-
thirty midnight (Tr. 112). Defendant's car was 
parked at a motel there (Tr. 112. The party regis-
tered into a unit at the motel (Tr. 112). 
Before retiring and at that late hour the wife 
and the brother-in-law went to the defendant's 
motel unit, tried the screen door which was locked, 
called to the defendant and attempted to have a con-
versation with him. They received no response from 
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defendant. Plaintiff's testimony and that of their 
witnesses was to the effect that no commotion was 
occasioned during this attempted interview with 
defendant. Failing their purpose the party then re-
tired for the night, the wife, sister and mother to 
the motel unit, the brother-in-law to a bed made 
down in his station wago11. The brother-in-law re-
moved only his shoes and laid on top of the covers 
(Tr. 113-119). The defendant testified that he saw 
from his room the brother-in-law's car drive up to 
the motel; that the wife and brother-in-law pounded 
on his door and tried to break it down and caused 
considerable disturbance for some thirty 1ninutes 
(Tr. 29·2, 293), which male occupants of another 
unit complained of the terrible noise being carried 
on (Tr. 293). 
Defendant then waited in his motel u11til 2 
or 2 :15 A.M. and at that time when a truck 
was passing :by went from his room to his car; 
entered the car, locked the doors and started the 
motor ( Tr. 293, 294). 
'The plaintiffs, who had disrobed only to the 
extent of removing dresses, shoes and stockings, 
were awakened by a door slamming (Tr. 159): 
they arose and ran out to defendant's car. The wife 
ran to the left side and called to the brother-in-law 
('Tr. 160). The sister ran to the right side (Tr. 
260). The wife took ahold of the door handle on 
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the left side (Tr. 161); the sister took ahold of 
the door handle on the right side ( Tr. 260). Both 
plaintiffs testified that they spoke to the defendant 
at this time but that the defendant did not answer 
them ('Tr. 161 and 260, 261). The defendant testi-
fied that he asked both women to get off the car 
(Tr. 350). 
The defendant backed his car up to obtain 
clearance and then drove forward through the gas 
station onto the highway. There is some testimony 
in the record [denied by defendant] that he "weav-
ed'' the car when backing and there is -a conflict 
in the evidence as to the speed at which defendant 
drove away. Both plaintiffs fell or were thrown 
to the ground and were injured. 
Plaintiffs' complaints allege the act of defen-
dant vvas willful and intentional and the pre-trial 
order limited the issue to an intentional injury (Tr. 
12) . However, plaintiffs abandoned the theory of 
intentional injury and ill will ('Tr. 155, 156) and 
at the trial's conclusion the Court, over defendant's 
objection, granted plaintiffs' motion to amend the 
pre-trial order to include negligence ('Tr. 371). The 
pre-trial judge had earlier denied such motion ('Tr. 
26) as had the trial judge (Tr. 27, 28). 
We think this to be a fair statement of the case 
sufficient for the purposes of this appeal. 
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SITATEMENT OF POIN'TS 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFFS HAVING PLACED 'THEMSELVES 
IN A POSITION OF PERIL ASSUMED THE RISK OF 
INJURY. 
POIN'T II. 
PLAINTIFFS TRESPASSED UPON DEFENDANT'S 
M·OTOR VEHICLE AND DEFENDANT OWED PLAIN-
TIFFS ONLY THE DUTY OF NOT WILLFULLY OR 
WAN'TONLY INJURING THEM. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING DEFEN-
DANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT OF NO 
CAUSE OF AC'TION. 
POINT IV. 
THE ·COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
MO'TION TO SUBMIT THE ISSUE OF ORDINARY 
NEGLIGENCE TO THE JURY. 
POINT V. 
A WIFE HAS NO ·cAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST 
HER HUSBAND FOR A NON-INTENTIONAL INJURY 




PLAINTIFFS HAVING PLACED THEMSELVES 
IN A POSITION OF PERIL ASSUMED THE RISK OF 
INJURY. 
When a plaintiff brings himself within the 
operation of the maxim, volenti non fit injuria, he 
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cannot recover. Westborough Country Club v. Palm-
er, C.A. Mo., 204 F.2d 143. In Smith v. Mining 
Company, 27 Utah 307, 32'5, 75 Pac. 749, this Court 
said: 
"Mr. 'Thompson, in his Commentaries on 
the law of Negligence, vol. 1, sec. 185, says: 
'Where a person, by his own deliberate act, 
brings an injury upon himself, he can not 
make it the ground of recovering damages 
against another, where he is not impelled 
thereto by some imminent danger, or by some 
exciting or exasperating circumstances, for 
which that other is responsible. The principle 
that a person can not make his own wrong 
or his voluntary act, v;hether wrongful or not, 
the ground of recovering damages from an-
other, has found an expression in the maxim, 
"Volenti non fit injuria.' " 
The applicability of the doctrine of assump-
tion of risk is based upon the knowledge and appreci-
ation of a danger and the voluntary occupation of 
a position of danger in disregard of the use of 
ordinary care. 
There is no conflict in the evidence to the fact 
that plaintiffs ran, one to each side of defendant's 
automobile, and held on to the door handles thereof. 
'The wife on the left side (Tr. 161) ; the sister, on 
the right side (Tr. 260). The plaintiffs must have 
had knowledge of the danger and certain1ly they 
voluntarily exposed themselves to it. The facts in 
this case meet every test laid down by this Court 
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in ·Clay v. Dunford, 121 Utah 177, 239 P.2d 1075, 
for the application of the doctrine of assumption 
of risk. In ·Clay v. Dunford this Court said: 
"!The defense of assumption of risk as a 
legal concept requires that the plaintiff must 
have looked, must have seen and must have 
known of a danger, voluntarily subjecting 
·himself thereto and ·consenting that if injury 
result, he who may have negligently exposed 
him thereto should be relieved of any liability 
therefor. It has been said that 'knowledge of 
the risk is the watchword of * * * assump-
tion of risk' ''. * * * 
POIN·T II. 
PLAINTIFFS 'TRESPASSED UPON DEFENDANT'S 
MOTOR VEHICLE AND DEFENDANT OWED PLAIN-
'TIFFS ·ONLY THE DUTY OF NOT WILLFULLY OR 
WANTONLY INJURING THEM. 
Plaintiffs trespassed upon defendant's auto-
n1obile - this fact cannot be disputed. "Under or-
dinary circumstances there is no liability for injury 
to trespassers whether the trespass is committed 
on land or on personal property." 65 C.J.S., Negli-
gence, Sec. 24, p. 440. "A motorist owes no duty to 
a trespasser whose presence is unknown; and, zehen 
the trespasser's presenc.e is knozcn, the operator 
ow.es him only the duty not zcillfully or war/;tonly 
to injure him." (Emphasis ours). 60 C.J.S., Motor 
Vehicles, Sec. 401, p. 1020. 
We direct the Court's attention to the special 
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verdicts in these causes wherein the jury found 
defendant negligent in not using due care (Tr. 83, 
86) . For a discussion of the accepted meanings of 
"willfulness and wantonness" see the remarks of 
Mr. Justice Straup, in J,ensen v. Denver and R.G.R. 
Co., 44 Utah 100, 138 P. 1185, 1188, 1189. Under 
a somewhat similar fact situation to the cause at 
bar, Byers v. Gunn, Florida, 81 So.2d 723, that Court 
declared that where a girl sat on an automobile fen-
der after being refused admittance into the auto-
mobile by friend, and the friend started to drive 
off, and the girl fell off the fender and was hurt, 
girl's status at time was that of trespasser. The 
defendant in this cause locked the car doors and 
thus refused plaintiff's admittance to his automo-
bile. While persisting to attach themselves to the 
automobile, plaintiffs trespassed. Viewing the facts 
in this case in a light most favorable to the plain-
tiffs, we respectfully contend that there is no show-
ing of willfulness or wantonness on the part of the 
defendant such as would support the verdict in 
plaintiffs' favor. 
''IThe demarcation between ordinary neg-
ligence, and willful and wanton disregard, is 
that in the latter the actor was fully aware 
of the danger and should have realized its 
proba;ble consequences, yet deliberately avoid-
ed all precaution to prevent disaster. A failure 
to act in prevention of accident is but simple 
negligence; a mentally active restraint from 
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such action is willful. Omitting to weigh con-
sequences is simple negligence; refusing to 
weigh them is willful. Performance of a dan-
gerous act willfully, under certain circum-
stane:es, as in an emergency, is permissible, 
.and will not subject the actor to liability * * * 
(Emphasis ours).'' 
Pettingell v. Molde (Colo. 1954), 271 P.2d 1038, 
1042. 
The Court's attention is directed to the follow-
ing colloquy between the trial judge and counsel for 
plaintiffs: 
The Court: If you want to show he had 
an ill will toward them and hurt them inten-
tionally, you can go into that. * * * 
Mr. Cassity: I do not intend to show 
he had any ill will Your Honor. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING DEFEN-
DANT'S MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT OF NO 
CAUSE OF AC'TION. 
At the conclusion of the trial the defendant 
made the following motion to the Court: 
MR. HANSON: Comes now the defen-
dant and moves the Court to direct a verdict 
of no cause of action in favor of the defendant 
and against both of the plaintiffs on the fol-
lowing grounds : 
( 1) That the eYidence conclusively 
shows, as a matter of law, that the plaintiffs 
in seizing the defendant's car, con1mitted an 
assult upon him, and that his actions there-
10 
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after were motivated solely by the desire to 
escape plaintiffs and their associate Marshall, 
and the evidence conclusively shows that in 
attempting to escape, the defendant did not 
use unreasonable force. 
( 2) That if plaintiffs' action in seizing 
the door handles to the defendant's car, did 
not amount to an assault upon the defendant, 
then their status, in seizing the handles of said 
car, was that of trespassers, and the defen-
dant's only duty tovvard them was not to 
wilfully injure them; that the evidence is con-
clusive that he did not attempt to, or did not 
wilfully injure them, but that his actions were 
motivated solely by the desire to escape a pos-
sible harm or danger to himself. 
The evidence also conclusively shows that 
the plaintiffs could have released the handles 
of his car any time after it started to move, 
and thereby could have avoided further dan-
ger or injury to themselves. 
That if the case Vv"'as submitted to the 
jury on negligence we contend the only issue 
that COlild possibly be here, was that of inten-
tional acts on the part of the plaintiffs, in 
seizing and clinging to the car, but if sub-
mitted to the jury on negligence, it is the con-
tention of the defendant, that plaintiffs were 
contributorily negligent, as a matter of law, 
in failing to release the handles of the car, 
and, further, that they assumed the risk, as 
a matter of law, in continuing to hold on to 
said door handles until they were forced to 
release it, by the moven1ent of the car, or the 
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The Court denied the motion ('Tr. 370). The 
evidence conclusively shows [there is no conflict] 
plaintiffs assumed the risk of injury to themselves 
as a matter of law; and, plaintiffs were contribu-
torily negligent as a matter of law. Plaintiffs readi-
ly admit that they voluntarily attached themselves 
to defendant's automobile by seizing onto the door 
handles on each side of the vehicle. Each plaintiff 
could have avoided injury to herself by (a) not 
taking hold of the door handle: (b) by releasing 
her hold. 
"It has :been a rule of law from time im-
memorial, and is not likely to be changed in 
all time to come, that there can be no recovery 
for an injury caused by the mutual default of 
both parties. When it can be shown that it 
would not have happened except for the culp-
a'ble negligence of the party injured, concur-
ring with that of the other party, no action 
can be maintained." 1 Tlwmp. Comm. Neg. 
section 186; Wharton, Neg. Section 73; 2 
Jaggard on Torts, 960; Ray, Neg. Imp. Dut. 
Fass. 669, 670. 
R~ailroad Co. v. Aspell, 23 Pa. St. 147, 62 Am. 
Dec. 3·23; Smith v. Mining Co. (1904), 27 Utah 307, 
325, 75 Pac. 749. 
In this case the jury found that defendant was 
guilty of negligence in the operation of his auto-
mo'bile and they charged defendant with all the con-
sequences of the accident regardless of plaintiff's 
conduct. That they had no right to do. If plaintiffs 
12 
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had exercised that ordinary care, prudence, and fore-
sight which the law requires of everyone for their 
own safety, the accident could not have happened. 
"A plaintiff who does not observe the 
standards of due care the law imposes upon 
him cannot recover." [Jensen v. Logan City, 
89 Utah 347, 57 P.2d 78; Pollari v. Salt Lake 
City, Ill Utah 25, 176 P.2d 111.] 
'T·he facts of this case bring it within the rule 
stated by this Court in Cooper v. Evans, 1 Utah 2d 
68, 262 p .2d 2'78: 
"Contributory negligence would * * * 
be a question of law where the evidence show-
ed, with such certainty that reasonable minds 
could not differ thereon, that the conduct in 
question * * * failed to meet the standard 
of due care." 
There is no conflict in the evidence that the car 
first backed up (Tr. 120, 121), stopped ('Tr. 121, 
122), then went forward (Tr. 122); that the plain-
tiffs fell from the car after it proceeded forward 
( Tr. 162, 263). Common knowledge and experience 
tells us that there had to be a period of time when, 
after backing, the car was immobile and that plain-
tiffs could have released their holds while the car 
was standing still. 
In Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah 289, 
259 P. 2d 297, this Court said, in part: 
"* * * Dr. Morris appears to be con-
fronted with two horns of a dilemma, either 
(a) the room was sufficiently lighted so that 
13 
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he could and should by the exercise of ordi-
nary, reasonable care and observation for his 
own safety see the chair and avoid walking 
into it, or (b) the room, or the portion there-
of in question, was so dark that he could not 
see an object such as a chair, in which event 
due care would have required him to turn on 
a light. 
"As to alternative (a), the statement of 
the proposition answers itself. An object the 
size of a chair is something which one using 
ordinary care ought to see; and that he should 
heed it, the Doctor's unfortunate experience 
painfully demonstrated. * * * 
"* * * But upon mature reflection, ra-
tional minds will be of one accord as to where 
the responsibility lies. Whether Dr. Morris 
chooses alternative (a) above, that the room 
was light, or (b) that it, or a portion thereof, 
was dark, we see no escape for him: we be-
lieve all reasona'ble minds would conclude 
that he was guilty of contributory negligence. 
* * * although we are sensitive of the 
duty of courts to safeguard the rights of citi-
zens to have grievances fully tried on the 
merits to courts and juries under proper cir-
cumstances, this does not lead to the necessity 
or desirability of such submission where, tak-
ing the evidence and all fair inferences there-
from most favorable to a plaintiff, all reason-
able minds must yet conclude that his own lack 
of due care proximately contributed to cause 
his injury. * * *" 
The facts in the instant case, it appears to 
the writer, point to an even more clear case of con-
14 
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tributory negligence on the part of plaintiffs here. 
In Wold v. Ogden City, 123 Utah 270, 258 P.2d 
4'53, the plaintiff exposed himself to an obvious 
danger, this Court declared : 
And 
''* * * the right to hav.e ~a jury pass upon 
issues of fact does not include the right to 
hav.e a caus.e submitted to a jury in the hop.e 
of 1a verdict where the facts undisputably show 
that the plaintiff is not entitled to re-
lief. * * *" 
"* * * where it is clear that any person 
of normal intelligence in his position must 
have understood the dang.er, the issue must be 
d-ecided by the court." 
In Knox v. Snow, 119 Utah 522, 229 P.2d 874, 
this Court opined tha;t: 
"A reasonable person makes some ob-
servations along the path he chooses to fol-
low." 
And found plaintiff to have been contributorily 
negligent as a matter of law for having neglected 
to use the care required of a prudent man. 
POIN'T IV. 
'THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING PLAIN'TIFF'S 
MO'TION TO SUBMIT THE ISSUE OF ORDINARY 
NEGLIGENCE TO THE JURY. 
It cannot be said that plaintiffs did not tres-
pass upon defendant's automobile. As we have point-
ed out in our Point II of this brief, the defendant 
owed to plaintiffs, as tresspassers, only the duty of 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
not wilfully or wantonly causing them injury. The 
record fails to disclose and wilful, wanton, inten-
tional or malicious act on the part of defendant. 
T·he jury found that the acts of the defendant in in-
juring the plaintiff Marshall were not activated 
by malice ; and, that the actions of the defendant 
in injuring the plaintiff Tayler were not motivated 
by malice (Tr. 84, 86). Malice in law is the inten-
tio'ltal doing of a wrongful act without just cause 
or excuse. ''Wilfullness" implies an act done inten-
tionally and designedly; "wantonness" implies ac-
tion without regard to the rights of others, a con-
scious failure to observe care, a conscious invasion 
of the rights of others, wilful, unrestrained action. 
Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition. 
We submit an act done without malice is not 
"wilful'' or "intentional"; a "not-wilful" act can-
not be "wanton" in the eyes of the law. 
POIN'T V. 
A WIFE HAS NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST 
HER HUSBAND FOR A NON-INTENTIONAL INJURY 
INFLIC'TED BY T'HE HUSBAND DURING COVER-
'TURE. 
We are familiar with the ruling of this Court 
in Taylor v. Patten, 2 Utah 2d 404, 275 P.2d 696, 
wherein Mr. Justice Wade wrote "* * * under our 
statutes a wife may recover fron1 her husband for 
intentionally inflicted injuries. * * *" The jury in 
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our cause found only that the defendant was "negli-
gent in not using due care" and that the injury to 
the plaintiff wife was not motivated by malice (R. 
86). There was no intentional injury inflicted upon 
the wife by the defendant husband in this cause. 
Mr. Justice Crockett in his concurring opinion said, 
"* * * the plaintiff may sue the defendant for an 
alleged intentional personal injury coramitted during 
the interlocutory period; * * *" and, went on to care-
fully point out certain considerations which " * * * 
may well be deemed to be of sufficient importance 
to lead to the conclusions that such suits should not 
be maintainable during coverture. * * *"The Justice 
declared: "* * * If such suits can be maintained, 
widespread insurance coverage, particularly in auto-
mobile cases, poses a great temptation for collusion, 
which it should not be the policy of the law to en-
courage. * * *" (Emphasis ours). This statement 
is in complete accord with the general weight of 
authority. We feel that to further relax the common 
law rule in this jurisdiction would indeed create 
an undesirable situation and it is our considered 
opinion that the Legislature, in conferring equality 
of right to sue, did not confer a right of action never 
possessed by husband or wife at common law. Conley 
v. Conley, 9!2 Mont. 425, 15 P.2d 92'2, 925. 
The case at bar is clearly distinguishable in its 
fact situation from T~aylor v. Patten, supra, in that 
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(a) the injuries to the wife were clearly not inten-
tionally inflicted; and, (b) the parties were married 
and not divorced on September 12, 1956, the date 
of the accident. The parties' divorce decree was 
entered October 16, 19'56 (Tr. 290). 
IT·his Court in Taylor v. Patten, supra, in its 
main opinion, the concurring opinion and in the dis-
senting opinion exhaustively reviews the authorities 
on this issue. We would not belabor the Court with 
those authorities of which the Court is fully cogni-
zant. However, since the reporting of Taylor v. Pat-
ten, there has 'been published an exhaustive annota-
tion, 43 ALR 2d 634, wherein the "Summary" opens 
with the following declaration: 
'~The relatively great amount of litigation 
in which the question of the right of one spouse 
to bring an action against the other for per-
sonal injuries has been raised, is due, in large 
part, to the widespread enactment of married 
women's statutes relieving "\Vives from many 
of the disabilities imposed upon them by the 
common law. The argu111ent has been, and con-
tinues to be, made that these enactments, most 
of which, either in terms or by implication, 
permit a married woman to sue and be sued 
as if she were single, have the effect of ab-
rogating the rule of spousal disability. In 
what must now be referred to as a dwindling 
majority of jurisdictions this arg·u1nent has 
been rejected by tl1e courts, and in one juris-
diction - Illinois - the argument, after 
having been accepted by the courts, was re-
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jected by the legislature, which amended the 
Illinois married women's statute to specifi-
cally bar actions by one spouse against the 
other for torts occurring during coverture. 
* * * 
"In the case of a spouse's post-divorce 
suit for personal injuries caused by the other 
spouse during coverture, the courts are agreed 
that the spousal disability rule operates to 
bar the suit.'' 
* * * Abb~tt v. Abbott ( 1877) 67 Me. 304, 
24 Am Rep 2'7 * * *. - · 
* * * Callow v. Thomas ( 1948) 3'22 Mass. 
550, 78 NE2d 637, 2 ALR2d 63'2. 
* * * Bandfield v. B.andfield ( 1898) 117 
Mich. 80, 75 NW 287, 40 LRA 757, 72 Am 
St Rep 550.-
* * * Strom v. Strom (1906) 98 Minn. 427, 
107 NW 1047, 6 LRA NS 191, 116 Am St Rep 
387. 
* * * Nickerson v. Nickerson ( 1886) 65 'Tex. 
281; Lunt v. Lunt (1938, Tex. Civ App) 121 
SW2d 445, error dismd (recognizing rule). 
* * * Schultz v. Christopher (1911) 65 
Wash. 496, 118 P. 629, 38 LRA NS 780. 
* * * Phillips v. Barnett (1876) LR 1 QB 
Div 436. 
The majority view denies the right of action. 
The states appear divided 31 to 17 with Utah align-
ed with the minority on the authority of Taylor v. 
Patten. We do not read T~aylor v. Patten as com-
pletely abrogating the cor.amon-law rule of spousal 
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disability, or as authorization for civil action based 
upon simple negligence duri11g coverture. 
Concluding, we would call the Court's atten-
tion to the case of Romero v. Romero ( 1954), 58 
N.M. 201, 269 P.2d 748, wherein that Court in its 
unanimous opinion holds : 
"It appears to have been the purpose of 
the act of 1897 (19-606 supra.) [married 
woman statute] to give the wife a remedy 
to sue alone for actionable wrongs which for-
merly could not be independently redressed. 
It removed the common law procedural bar-
rier that a wife must join with her husband 
in all actions for or against her, but, we are 
of opinion, and so hold, that it did not create 
a substantive right of action against her hus-
band for a tort committed against her. This 
view is not only supported by the decision of 
the United States Supreme Court in Tltomp-
son v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611, 31 S. Ct. 111, 
54 L. Ed. 1180, but is in accord with the gen-
eral weight of authority as is reflected by de-
cisions of thirty sister states and the terri-
tories of Alaska and Hawaii. * * *" (Em-
phasis added) . 
CON·CLUSION 
The evidence shows that the wife, sister, mother 
and brother-in-law descended upon the de~endant 
in force in the middle of the night for no other pur-
pose, they say, than to have a talk with him. With 
some apprehension as to the Inotives of this group 
20 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the defendant attempted to fold his. tent like the 
Arabs and silently steal away. Defendant's attempt 
to maintain the peace and the status quo was frus-
trated through the assault and trespass of plaintiffs 
upon him; the intentional acts of the plaintiffs re-
sulted in what they should have known could well 
occur, personal injury to thernselves; a regrettable 
but understandable happenstance often known to 
occur under such circumstances. 
The verdict should be set aside and plaintiffs 
sent hence with naught. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON, BALDWIN AND ALLEN, 
WALTER L. BUDGE 
Attorneys for Appellant. 
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